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incumbent, Senator Butler, and the contest is expected to be-
a very bitter one. What is the use and purpose of this
unusual and rapid organization of militia?
Mr. McLaurin, a Tillmanite, and Congressman from South.
Carolina, says of Tillman's genius that it is "essentially de-
structive." The Aikon Journal Review comments thus on the-
remark: "Tillman has destroyed good feeling between the
people of the State, he has destroyed confidence in the State,.
he has about destroyed the State altogether." If Tillman
could be dropped out of sight and hearing, South Carolina,
in a few months, would again be peaceful happy and pros-
perous.
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By J OH H. INGHAM, Fs2.
On December 24, 1892, the General Assembly of South
Carolina passed an "Act to prohibit the manufacture and sale
of intoxicating liquors as a beverage within this State except
as herein provided." This act provides for the appointment by
the Governor of a commissioner who shall purchase all intoxi-
cating liquors for sale in the State and furnish them to County
Dispensers', after they have been tested and declared to be pure
and unadultered. He shall not receive from. the Dispensers.-
more than fifty per cent. above the net cost, and this amount
is to be paid to the State Treasurer every month, and on this
fund he is to draw for all necessary expenses, and in all his
actions he is to be subject to the rules and orders of a State
Board of Control, composed of the Governor, the Comptroller-
General and the Attorney-General. Before entering upon his
duties he is to execute a bond to the State Treasurer in the
penal sum of $ lO,OOO for the faithful performance of such
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duties. The County Dispensers are to be appointed by County.
Boards of Control (appointed by the State Board of Control),
but permits are not to be issued to them before they file
petitions signed by a majority of the freehold voters of the
town or city in which the permit is to be used, requesting the
same and certifying to the character and sobriety of the
petitioner, and they are to enter into bonds in the penal sum
of $3,0oo for the faithful performance of their duties. These
duties are, among others, to sell intoxicating liquors only at
the place designated in the permit, and at a charge not-
exceeding fifty per cent. above the net cost; not to furnish,
them to any person unknown to the Dispenser personally, or-
not duly identified, nor to any minor, intoxicated person or
persons addicted to intoxication; to make accurate returns.
every month to the County Board of Control of all certificates and
requests, and of all sales made during the month; to keep strict
accounts of all liquors receive& from the State Commissioner,
and to pay all profits, after paying the expenses of the County
Dispensary, one-half to the County Treasury and one-half to.-
the municipal Corporation in vhich the Dispensary is located..
Provision is made for the selling of liquors for medicinal
purposes to licensed druggists at a net profit of not over ten
per cent., and the sum of $5o,ooo is appropriated to the pur-
chase of liquors that are to be distributed to the County-
Dispensers. Penalties are imposed for keeping liquor at
clubs and all places where it is sold in violation of the Act are-
declared common nuisances and are to be searched, closed and
abated. After July I, 1893, no person shall manufacture or-
sell intoxicating liquors for any purpose whatsoever, otherwise
than is provided in the Act, and licenses already authorized to.
be granted shall be in force only until July 1, 1893. The.
section of the Act relating to requests for purchase I quote int
full: "Sec. I I. Before selling or delivering any intoxicating-
liquors to any person a request must be presenpted to, the!
County Dispenser printed or written in ink, dated of the true
date, stating the age* and residence of the signer for whom and
for whose use the liquor is required, the quantity and kind
requested, and his or her true name and residence, and, where
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numbered, by street and number, if in a city, and the request
shall be signed by the applicant in his own true name and
signature, attested by the County Dispenser or his clerk who
receives and files the request, in his own true name and signa-
ture, and'in his own handwriting. But the request shall be
refused if the County Dispenser filling it personally knows the
applicant applying is a minor, that he is intoxicated, or that he
is in the habit of using intoxicated liquors to an excess; or if
the applicant is not so personally known to said County Dis-
penser before, filling said order or delivering said liquor, he
shall require identification, and the statement of a reliable and
trustworthy person of good character and habits, known
personally to him, that the applicant is not a minor, and is not
in the habit of using intoxicating liquors to excess."
These requests are to be made on blanks furnished to the
Dispenser by the County Auditor. The Dispenser is to preserve
the applications and return them to the Auditor who is to
file and preserve them, to be used in the quarterly settlements
between the County Dispenser and County Treasurer. The
scenes of riot and bloodshed that followed the attempt to put
this law (thereby proved to be an unpopular one), into execu-
tion are fresh within the memory of all and it is unnecessary
to do more than allude to them. The validity of the Act was
brought into question 'in the cases of McCullough v. Evans,
State v. Jacobs, etc. (heard together), and the Supreme Court
decided (Pope, A. J., dissenting) against its constitutionality,
except in so far as it forbade the granting of licenses to retail
spirituous liquors beyond June 30, 1893. The grounds of the
decision were: I. The traffic in intoxicating liquors not being
in itself unlawful or immoral, but such littuor being, on the
contrary, a lawful subject of commerce, an Act forbidding
anyone in the State from engaging in such traffic conflicts with
the rights of personal liberty, and private property secured by
the Constitution, unless it is a legitimate exercise of the police
power of the Covernment. "Before, therefore, the sale of
intoxicating liquors can be declared unlawful, there must be
some valid statute declaring it to be so; and we must say that
we have been unable to find any shch statute on the statute
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books of the State. . . . It does not seem to us possible to
regard the Dispensary Act as a law prohibiting the sale of
intoxicating liquors. On the contrary it not only permits but
absolutly encourages such sale to an unlimited extent; for,
by its profit feature, it holds out an inducement to every tax-
payer to encourage as large sales as possible and thereby lessen
the burdens of taxation to the extent of the profits realized.
If the Act, instead of confining the privilege of selling liquor
to the State, had undertaken to confer such exclusive privilege
upon one or more individuals, or upon a particular corporation,
could there be any doubt that such an exercise of legislative
power would be unconstitutional? We can see no difference
in principle between the two cases." In other words, the
court seems to be led into the curious statement that, while an
Act declaring a lawful trade unlawful for all purposes is
perfectly valid, an Act restriqting that trade is invalid simply
for the want of such a declaration.
2. The Act is not a legitimate exercise of the police power
reg-ulating the. sale of intoxicating liquors as it forbids the sale
by all private persons, and if it be said that the sales by
government officials are regulated by the Act, still. "the police
power can only be resorted to for the government and control
of the people of the State and cannot with any propriety be
appealed to for the purpose of controlling the action of the
State itself. . . . The exertion of the police power, especially
where it abridges or destroys the constitutional right of the
citizen, can only be vindicated as a measure of self defence.
. . . or . . . by some overruling necessity. If the various
restrictions and regulations as to the sale of intoxicating
liquors by the officers and agents of the State be designed
only for the protection of the public health or the public
morals, and are fit and appropriate to that end, we do not see
why such restrictions and regulations could not be applied to
the sale of such liquors by private individuals, and, if so, there
was no necessity for any such sweeping act, whereby the
constitutional rights of the -citizen, hereinbefore referred to,
have been absolutely destroyed, but these rights should be re-
served to the citizen and only restricted by such regulations as
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may be necessary for the public good. But in addition to this
we are compelled to say, without in the slightest degree
intending to impeach the motives or to criticise the intentions
of the members of the Legislature by which this Act was
passed, and, on the contrary, freely according to them the
best motives and the purest intentions, that; judging the Act
from the terms employed in it (the only way in which a court
is at liberty to form an opinion), it cannot be justly regarded as
a police regulation, but simply as an Act to increase the
revenue of the State and its subordinate governmental agencies.
This is apparent from the profit features of the Act, from the
various stringent provisions designed to compel consumers of
intoxicating liquors to obtain them from the officers and agents
of the State, and notably by the provision authorizing the State
Commissioner to sell such liquors to persons outside of the
limits of the State, which certainly* cannot be regarded as
bearing the faintest resemblance to a police regulation for the
purpose of protecting the public health of the public morals of
the people of this State. But it is earnestly contended by the
Attorney-General that if the power to prohibit absolutely the
sale of intoxicating liquors be conceded, it follows necessarily
that the State may assume the monopoly of such a trade, and
in support of this view h e cites Tiedeman on the Limitations
of the Police Power, 3 18, where that author uses the following
language: 'There is' no doubt that a trade or occupation
which is inherently and necessarily injurious to society may be
prohibited altogether; and it does not seem to be questioned
that the prosecution of such a business may be assumed by
the government and managed by it as a monopoly.' But the
only authority which the author cites to gustain this rather"
extraordinary proposition is the case of State v. Brennen's
Liquors, 25 Conn. 278, overlooking entirely the case of Beebe
v. State, 6 Ind. 5ol, which holds an opposite view -and which
had previously been cited by the same author at page 197 and
quoted from, apparently, with approval. But in addition to
this we are unable to perceive how the right to prohibit a
given traffic carries with it the power in the State to assume
the monoply of such traffic. If the right to probibit the sale
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of intoxicating liquors rests upon the ground that such a
traffic ' is inherently and necessarily injurious to society,' as is
involved in the statement by the author of this proposition,
then it seems to us that the logical and necessary consequence
ivould be that the State could not engage in such traffic, for
otherwise, we should be compelled to admit the absurd propo-
sition that a State government, established for the very
purpose of protecting society, could lawfully engage in a
business which 'is inherently and necessarily injurious to
society.' We must prefer then to. follow the case of Beebe v.
State, rather than State v. Brennen's Liquors." The court
cites the case of Rippe v. Becker (Minn.), 57 N. W. Rep. 331,
which I shall refer to later.
3. The Legislature have no authority to embark the State in
a trading enterprise; not because there is any express pro-
hibition, but because it is utterly at variance with the very idea
of civil government. .The conferring of legislative power in
the Constitution does not involve "the unlimited power of
legislating upon any subject or for any purpose according to
its unrestricted will, but must be construed as limited to such
legislation as may be necessary or appropriate to the real and
only purpose for which the Constitution was adopted, to wit:
the formation of a civil government . . . It is expressly
declared that 'The enumeration of rights in this Constitution
shall not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the
people, and all powers not herein delegated remain with the
people.' . . . It seems to us that the true construction of
this clause is that, while there are many rights which are
expressly reserved to the people with which the Legislature are
forbidden to interfere, there are other rights reserved to the
people, not expressly, but by necessary implication, which are
beyond the reach of the legislative power, unless such power
has been expressly delegated to the legislative department of
the government. . . It seems to us clear that any Act of
the Legislature which is designed to or has the effect of
embarking the State in any trade, which involves the purchase
and sale of any article of commerce for profit is outside of and
altogether beyond the legislative power conferred upon the
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General Assembly by the Constitution, even though there may
be no express provision in the Constitution forbidding such an
exercise of legislative power. Trade is not and cannot properly
be regarded as one of the functions of government. On the
contrary its function is to protect the citizen in the exercise of
any lawful employment, the right to which is guaranteed to the
citizen by the terms of the Constitution, and certainly has never
been delegated to any department of the government."
Pope, A. J., dissented for the following reasons. I. The
legislative power is absolutely unlimited, except so far as
restricted by the Federal and State Constitutions. The Dis-
pensary Act is no infringement on rights of life, liberty or
property. "It is unjust to the Act in question to ascribe to it
as its leading and controlling feature the raising of a revenue
for the State and its municipalities. The proper construction
is that in the exercise of the State's undoubted police power in
order to promote sobriety, preserve the.health and provide for
the safety of her citizens, the State has passed this law
prohibiting the sale of spirituous liquors by private persons, but,
recognizing the demand for pure, unadulterated liquors, she
has created a governmental agency under strict regulations to
sell those liquors with enough profit thereon to pay the
expenses of the purchase of these liquors, the expenses of con-
ducting the business and to police the State to prevent infrac-
tions of her laws in this Act provided." The entire right to
control and regulate the liquor traffic has been held in
innumerable decisions to belong to the Legislature in the
exercise of its police power. 2. The Legislature has the
power of conferring exclusive rights on municipal corporations
and on the State itself, a forori where, as here, there are no
inherent rights of others to be considered,-the right to manu-
facture and sell liquor, not being an inalienable one of a
citizen as such, according to numerous Federal and State
decisions. "No one is wronged when he is only excluded
from that in which he never had a right .... Very ingeniously,
it is suggested, how can the State regulate itself? This is
specious and unsound. The people are the State. The
government is their agency. Does not the State run the
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health department, furnishing the plant necessary to conduct
that beneficient work and pay all its expenses, under a system
of regulation? So, too, the State Penitentiary, the Lunatic
Asylum, the Deaf and Dumb Institute? Look at the Post
Office of the General Government. 'Then it is again suggested,
this is a monopoly created by the State. As to this matter it
may be suggested that such a term of monopoly as applied
to a sovereign State is a misnomer. Monopolies at the
common law and against which all Englishmen protested,
were grants to individual citizens. Here the State operates
the business for the benefit of all her citizens. The people are
the State; the government is their agent and any benefits
under the Act are enjoyed by the whole people." Without
attempting to treat the elementary principles of Constitutional
Law that are discussed at great length in both opinions,
it may be said that it has been decided over and over again
that the whole matter of the control and regulation of the liquor
traffic is one that belongs to the Legislatures of the different
States by virtue of their police power and that, when they see
fit, they may totally prohibit the manufacture and sale of
liquor within the borders of their respective States: See The
License Cases, 5 How. 504; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall.
713; Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129; Mugler v. Kansas,
123 U. S. 623; Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. I; Crowley v.
Christensen, 137 U. S. 86; Reynolds v. Geary, 26 Conn. 179;
Com. v. Kendall, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 414; Com. v. Gague, 153
Mass. 205; Jones v. Peo., 14 Ill. 196; Pierce v. State, 13
N. H. 536; Preston v. Drew, 33 Me. 558; Paulv. Gloucester
Co., 50 N. J. L. 585 ; Trageser v. Gray, 73 Md. 250; Lincoln
v. Smith, 27 Vt. 328.
There is no inherent right of personal liberty or private
property which such laws infringe on. In Crowley v.
Christensen, 137 U. S. 86, 91, the court say : "The police
power of the State is fully competent to regulate the business-
to mitigate its evils -or to suppress it entirely. There is no
inherent right in a citizen to thus sell intoxicating liquors by
retail ; it is not a privilege of a citizen of the State or of a
citizen of the United States. As it is a business attended with
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danger to the community it may, as already said, be entirely
prohibited or be permitted under such conditions as will limit
to the utmost its-evils. The manner and extent of regulation
rests in the discretion of the governing authority."
So in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 66o, it is said:
"But by whom or by what authority is it to be determined
whether the manufacture of particular articles of drink, either
for general use or for the personal use of the maker, will
injuriously affect the public? Power to determine such
questions so as to bind all must exist somewhere; else society
-will be at the mercy of the few who, regarding only their own'
.appetites or passions, may be willing to imperil the 'peace and
-security of the many, provided only, they are permitted to do
as they please. Under our system that power is lodged with
the legislative branch of the government. It belongs to that
,department to exercise what are known as fhe police powers
of the State and to determine primarily what measures
are appropriate or needful for the protection of the public
morals, the public health or the public safety. . . . It does
not at all follow that every statute enacted ostensibly for the
promotion of these ends is to be accepted as a legitimate
exertion of the police powers of the State. . . . If . . a
statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public
health, the public morals or the public safety, has no real or
substantial relation to those objects, or is a palpable invasion
of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of thie
courts so to adjudge and thereby give effect to the Constitu-
tion .... There is no justification for holding' that the State,
under the guise merely of police regulations, is here aiming to
deprive the citizen of his constitutional rights; for we cannot
shut out of view the fact within the knowledge of all, that the
public health, the public moral s, and the public safety may be
endangered by the general use of intoxicating drinks; nor the
fact, established by statistics accessible to everyone, that the
-idleness, disorder, pauperism and crime existing in the country
are, iii some degree at least, traceable to this evil."
In Trageser v. Gray, 73 Md. 250 , 253, the court say:
•" No one can claim as a right the power to sell either at any
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time or at any place, or in any quantity. If he is allowed to
sell under any circumstances, it is simply by the free permission
of the Legislature, and on such terms as it sees fit to impose.
. . . It was certainly the function of the law-making depart-
ment to exercise its judgment on this question, and this court
has no right to criticise its conclusion. We do not think that
this law is, in any manner, in conflict with the Constitution of
this State. We regard it as included 'in that immense mass
of legislation which embraces everything within the territory
of a State, not surrendered to the General Government."'
On the same principle, though somewhat extended, it was
held in Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, that a State
law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of oleomagarine was
a lawful exercise of the police power. The court says, on p.
685: "Whether the manufacture of oleomargarine, or
imitation butter, of the kind described in the statute, is or may
be conducted in such a way, or with such skill and secrecy
as to baffle ordinary inspection, or whether it involves such
danger to the pfblic health as to require, for the protection of
the people, the entire suppression of the business, rather than
its regulation in such manner as to permit the manufacture
and sale of articles of that class that do not contain noxious
ingredients, are questions of fact and of public policy which
belong to the legislative department to determine. And as it
does not appear upon the face of the statute or from any facts
of which the court must take judicial cognizance, that it
infringes rights secured by the fundamental law, the legisla-
tive determination of those questions is conclusive upon the
courts. . . . If all that can be said of this legislation is that it
is unwise, or unnecessarily oppressive to those manufacturing
or selling wholesome oleomargarine as an article of food, their
appeal must be to the Legislature, or to the ballot-box, not to
the judiciary. The latter cannot interfere without. unsurping
powers committed to another department of government."
It is difficult to s~e in the South Carolina Act anything
more than a plan (though a severe and, perhaps, unwise one)
of the Legislature to regulate the liquor trade so as to promote
public health and sobriety. Though there is a possibility of
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the State's more than covering its expenses, and thereby
making some profit, the main purpose of the revenue
provisions would appear to be, as the dissenting judge said,
"to pay.the expenses- of the purchases of these liquors, the
expenses of conducting the business and to police the State to
prevent infractions of her laws." The principal question in
the case is, therefore, whether the Legislature in the exercise
of its police power may grant exclusive privileges to the State
itself as against the citizens. With regard to the power of'
the State to grant monopolies, it is said in Tiedeman, Limns.
of Pol. Power, 326: "There is always this limitation to be
recognized upon the power to make a monopoly of, any trade
to be conducted by itself, or by some private individual or
corporation to whom it is granted as a privilege, viz.: that the
general prosecutiou of the trade or occupation by everyone-
who chooses- to engage in it, produces injurious results which
can only be avoided by making a monopoly of the trade."
That the extent to which the liquor traffic produces "injurious.
results" is a question for the Legislature to decide, is conclu-
sively settled by the cases cited above. It is also certain that
the State may grant to municipal corporations exclusive rights
to carry on injurious trades. 'In the Slaughter-house Cases,
16 Wall. 36, it was held that an Act forbidding anyone but a
particular cor'porat .ion from carrying on the business of run--
ning a slaughter-house was valid. The court said: "If this
statute had imposed on the city of New Orleans precisely the
same duties; accompanied by the same privileges which it has
on the corporation which it created, it is believed that no.
question would have been raised as to -its constitutionality.
In that case the effect on the butchers- in pursuit of their-
occupation, and on the public, would have been the same as it
is now. Why cannot the Legislature confer the same power-
on another corporation, created for a lawful and useful public
object, that it can on the municipal corporation already exist-
ing ?" In the same way, the exclusive right to supply water
or gas-light, or to lay railway tracks in the streets may be
given. The "obligation to serve the public impart ially would
seem to be an essential incident to any grant of a monopoly,.
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since without it it would be impossible to justify the grant on
public grounds:" Cooley, ConstL Law, 247.
In State v. Brennan's Liquors, 25 Conn. 278, cited in the
opinion of the court, it was held that the provisions in an Act
with regard to the exclusive sale of liquors by the towns
through agents appointed for that purpose, are not invalid as
giving to the towns a monopoly of such sale. The court say:
"The object of the Legislature in authorizing a sale by a
public agent for certain purposes was not to raise a revenue
for the town but to accommodate certain persons with spirits
for particular uses, and at the same time to guard against the
evils resulting from an indiscriminate sale by all persons and
for all purposes." But in Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501, a case
which the South Carolina court preferred to follow, similar
provisions were held unconstitutional. This decision was,
however, a mere corollary to the main one in the case which
went so far as to assert that all probibitory statutes were
unconstitutional and is opposed to nearly all the cases on the
subject, both State and Federal. The Indiana case is, there-
fore, not entitled to the weight given to it in the opinion in the
Dispensary case, especially as in a later case in the same State
it is said: "It is undoubtedly true that the common law does
not recognize any difference between intoxicating liquors as
property and any other species of property. But while it is
true that intoxicating liquor is property, still its inherent
character is such that it is the proper subject of the
police power. .... Acting upon the just assumption that
the unrestricted sale of intoxicating liquors results in
much evil and that it is detrimental to society, the law-
making power of each State in the Union has, in the exercise of
its police power, assumed to control, regulate or prohibit the
business, as seemed to it best. The extent to which such
power shall be exercised must, of necessity, be left to the law-
making power of the State exercising such right:" Welsh v.
State, 126 Ind. 71, 77. . This certainly seems to impugn the
authority of the earlier case. In Rippe v. Becker (Minn.), 57
N. W. Rep. 331, cited with approval in the opinion in the
principal case, it was held that an Act to provide for the
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erection of a State elevator or warehouse in a city for public
storage of grain, was not an exercise of the police power tco
regulate the business of receiving, weighing and inspecting
grain in elevators, "the evident sole purpose of th e Act," the
court said, being "to provide for the State erecting an elevator
and itself going into the 'grain elevator' business ... The
police power of the State to regulate a business does not
include the power to engage in carrying it on." This broad
statement, though applicable to a case where a State interferes
with rights of citizens to engage in ordinary business and
embarks in a trade for purposes of profit, can hardly be
extended to a case like the present where -the citizen has no
"inherent right" to practice the trade unmolested by the
Legislature, but where, on the contrary, that very trade is
universally recognized as one that falls peculiarly within the
scope of the police power. It is hard to gee why the Legisla-
ture, possessing all powers not denied them by the Constitution
and among others that of conferring exclusive franchises on
individuals and corporations, private and municipal, in matters
of a public character, should be debarred, without some express
prohibition in the Constitution, from conferring similar franchises
on the State itself. In other words, it should be for the
Legislature itself, in a case like the present, to determine
whether the business is "so far public and essential to' the
general welfare that it cannot properly be thrown open to all
and should therefore be conducted by the government directly
or through agencies which it constitutes and can control:"
Hare, Am. Constl. Law, 784.
